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<Article Head>SOUTH SUDANESE ARABIC AND THE NEGOTIATION OF THE 
LOCAL STATE, c. 1840–2011*</Article Head> 
 
Cherry Leonardi 
Durham University 
 
 Abstract 
This article explores the history of the creole South Sudanese Arabic 
language from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. It analyses the 
historical evidence of language use in the light of insights drawn from 
linguistic studies of creolisation to argue that South Sudanese Arabic became 
an innovative and necessary means of communication among multiple actors 
within new fields of interaction. The article argues that these fields of 
interaction were both the product and the arena of local state formation. 
Rather than marking the boundary of the state, the spread of this creole 
language indicates the enlarging arenas of participation in the local state. The 
development and use of South Sudanese Arabic as an unofficial lingua franca 
of local government, trade, and urbanisation demonstrates that 
communication and negotiation among local actors has been central to the 
long-term processes of state formation in South Sudan.  
 
Key Words 
Key words needed. 
 
<extract> There are three languages that are of value to the people. The first is vernacular, the 
second Arabic, the third English. The vernacular is the foundation of the people’s life; it 
guards their customs and their tribal beliefs. Arabic will be the language of commerce and of 
Local Government; it must be understood by all those who wish to take part in these spheres 
                                                          
*
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Noah Salomon, Chris Vaughan, Justin Willis and the reviewers of JAH for their most helpful comments and 
suggestions. Author’s email: d.c.leonardi@durham.ac.uk 
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of activity. The English language is the gateway to scientific knowledge; without this it is not 
possible to reach higher education.
1
 </extract> 
 This statement in 1950 to the Bahr el Ghazal Province Council by its British chairman 
and province governor reveals a considerable change in the policy of the Sudan government. 
Before 1947, the British administration of the southern provinces had officially sought to 
exclude Arabic from local government, and to restrict the entry of Arabic-speaking northern 
Sudanese. This ‘Southern Policy’, which was suddenly reversed from 1947, has provoked 
much subsequent criticism from scholars and Sudanese nationalists.
2
 Post-independence 
rulers would seek to remedy its perceived effects and to forcibly generate national unity 
through the imposition of Arabic language policies in the south. But the story of Arabic in 
southern Sudan is more complicated than this narrative of colonial exclusion followed by 
hastily attempted national integration. What Governor Owen did not reveal was that the 
Arabic already being used in commerce and local government was not generally the Arabic 
of northern Sudan, but the creole Arabic of southern Sudan. This language is often known as 
‘Juba Arabic’, but this article instead adopts the term ‘South Sudanese Arabic’ to encompass 
its regional and temporal variations across South Sudan.
3
 It originated as a pidgin language 
among southern slaves, soldiers, and servants in nineteenth-century trading camps and Turco-
Egyptian government stations, drawing its vocabulary primarily from the Egyptian and 
Sudanese colloquial Arabic of the traders and military officers; but it developed entirely new 
structures, recognised by linguists as a process of creolisation. This distinct language would 
                                                          
1
 South Sudan National Archives, Juba (SSNA) Equatoria Province (EP) 1.C.2, speech by Governor T.R.H. 
Owen, Bahr el Ghazal Province Council meeting, Wau, 25–6 Jan. 1950. 
2
 See, for example, M. ‘Abd al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in Constitutional and 
Political Development, 1899–1956 (Oxford, 1969). 
3
 There are, for example, distinctive varieties of South Sudanese Arabic associated with the other provincial 
capitals of Wau and Malakal. C. Miller, ‘Do they speak the same language? Language use in Juba local courts’, 
in E. Ditters and H. Motzki (eds.), Approaches to Arabic Linguistics: Presented to Kees Versteegh on the 
Occasion of his Sixtieth Birthday (Leiden, 2007), 607–38; C. Miller, ‘Southern Sudanese Arabic and the 
churches’, Revue Roumaine de Linguistique 3–4 (2010), 383–4; J. Owens, ‘Arabic-based pidgins and creoles’, 
in S. G. Thomason (ed.), Contact Languages: A Wider Perspective (Amsterdam, 1997), 133–5.  
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survive both the British attempts to suppress its use, and the subsequent efforts to promote 
Sudanese Arabic in the south.  
The military origins of this language and its subsequent use amongst soldiers, police, 
and other agents of state coercion have given it ambiguous moral and political connotations 
among South Sudanese. Yet its relationship to state power has never been straightforward, as 
the British efforts to suppress its use before 1947 indicate. While studies of other pidgins and 
creoles in Africa have often emphasised their origins in the need for communication between 
colonisers and colonised, some scholars point out that these languages have always been 
more important for communication among Africans.
4
 This is particularly evident in the case 
of South Sudanese Arabic, due to its official disapprobation. Its survival as an unofficial 
lingua franca of local government, trade, and urban interaction demonstrates that while these 
‘spheres of activity’ (as Owen termed them) were produced by and associated with the state, 
they were never entirely controlled by it. 
In exploring the history of South Sudanese Arabic, this article draws on two key 
arguments from linguistic studies of creolisation, elaborated below. Firstly, scholars have 
moved away from defining creolisation as the point when a pidgin language – that is a 
simplified contact language with restricted vocabulary created from a mixture of languages – 
becomes nativised as a first language, to defining it as the point when a pidgin language 
becomes necessary for communication in particular contexts, and hence develops as a main 
language of interaction. Secondly, linguistic studies of South Sudanese Arabic have argued 
that its creolisation entailed innovative restructuring, creating a new language rather than 
representing an attempt to speak a dominant or superstrate Arabic dialect.  
The article applies these insights to the historical evidence, to argue that the 
creolisation of South Sudanese Arabic was driven primarily by the need for communication 
                                                          
4
 N. G. Faraclas, Nigerian Pidgin (London, 1996), 3. 
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among local actors, including the state officials who were drawn into using this lingua franca. 
This also demonstrates the wider relevance of language history to the study of state 
formation. Scholars analysing African states have increasingly focused on the importance of 
local-level negotiation of the state among multiple actors who deploy particular discursive 
‘repertoires’ or ‘genres’, including ‘popular modes of communication’.5 Yet such studies 
rarely focus on the linguistic media of this negotiation, even when using creolisation as a 
metaphor for the resulting forms of governance and political culture.
6
 This article begins by 
exploring the value of a fuller and more precise analysis of linguistic creolisation as both 
metaphor and means of negotiating the local state. It then traces the history of South 
Sudanese Arabic from its origins as a military pidgin in the nineteenth century, through its 
development as a language of local government, trade, and urbanisation, to its current 
uncertain and ambiguous status as an unofficial national lingua franca of South Sudan. The 
article suggests that this enduring ambiguity represents the tensions, opportunities and 
exclusions that have characterised the local state. 
 
<A Head>CREOLISATION: LANGUAGES AND METAPHORS OF THE LOCAL 
STATE</A Head> 
 
Linguists have debated the definition of South Sudanese Arabic: is it a pidgin, a creole, or a 
‘post-creole’ Arabic dialect? 7  This set of categories was once seen to form a standard 
                                                          
5
 T. Hagmann and D. Péclard, ‘Negotiating statehood: dynamics of power and domination in Africa’, 
Development and Change, 41:4 (2010), 539–62; J.-F. Bayart, The Illusion of Cultural Identity (Chicago, 2005), 
110. 
6
 See, for example, A. Gupta, ‘Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the 
imagined state’, American Ethnologist, 22:2 (1995), 393. Peter Pels refers briefly to the medium of Swahili, in 
P. Pels, ‘Creolisation in secret: the birth of nationalism in late colonial Uluguru, Tanzania’, Africa: Journal of 
the International African Institute, 72:1 (2002), 1–28. 
7
 C. Miller, ‘The relevance of Arabic-based pidgins-creoles for Arabic linguistics’, in G. Mansur and M. Doss 
(eds.), Al-Lugha (Cairo, 2002), (http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/15/04/27/PDF/lugha-CREOLE.pdf), 27; 
M. Tosco, ‘A pidgin verbal system: the case of Juba Arabic’, Anthropological Linguistics, 37:4 (1995), 423; K. 
Versteegh, ‘Leveling in the Sudan: from Arabic creole to Arabic dialect’, International Journal of the Sociology 
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linguistic trajectory. The first stage of transition from pidgin to creole was traditionally 
defined by the nativisation and expansion of a pidgin into a mother tongue, a process that has 
been restricted to a small urban minority in southern Sudan. The situation here has also been 
complicated by regional variation in South Sudanese Arabic, and by the presence of Sudanese 
colloquial Arabic, whose influence was assumed by the 1980s to be leading to a 
‘decreolisation’ of South Sudanese Arabic. This has not occurred: many South Sudanese can 
speak Sudanese colloquial Arabic, and use simplified dialects of it as well as or instead of  
the creole South Sudanese Arabic, but this has not eradicated the creole.
8
 New varieties have 
also emerged since the 1980s, such as the slang spoken by urban youth, combining elements 
of vernacular language with South Sudanese Arabic.
9
 
Increasingly, however, linguists have abandoned the model of a clear trajectory from 
pidgin to creole to dialect, and have argued instead for a spectrum or continuum of language 
varieties; some adopt the hyphenated term ‘pidgin-creole’ to encompass these.10 Summing up 
new directions in pidgin-creole linguistics in 1991, Christine Jourdan argued that Solomons 
Pijin was spoken both as a limited pidgin in rural areas, and as a creole in the city, where it 
was ‘the main language of urban social interaction’, regardless of whether it was a first or 
second language.
11
 Jourdan therefore defined the creole not as a mother-tongue but as a ‘main 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Language, 99:1 (1993), 65–80; I. Smith and T. M. Ama, Juba Arabic – English Dictionary (Kampala, 2005), 
iv–v. 
8
 Miller, ‘Do they’, p. 608. 
9
 C. Miller, ‘Un parler “argotique” à Juba, sud Soudan’, in D. Caubet, J. Billiez, and T. Bulot (eds.), Parlers 
Jeunes, Ici et Là-Bas: Pratiques et Représentations (Paris, 2004), 69–90; S. Nakao, ‘Revising the 
substratal/adstratal influence on Arabic creoles’, in O. Hieda (ed.), Challenges in Nilotic Linguistics and More, 
Phonology, Morphology and Syntax, Studies in Nilotic Linguistics, vol. 5 (Tokyo, 2012), 131; in contrast, see L. 
Swigart, ‘Cultural creolisation and language use in post-colonial Africa: the case of Sénégal’, Africa, 64:2 
(1994), 175–89. 
10
 Miller, ‘Do they’, 621 and 608; Tosco, ‘A pidgin’, 451. 
11
 C. Jourdan, ‘Pidgins and creoles: the blurring of categories’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 20:1 (1991), 
194–6. 
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language’ in specific contexts – contexts that, as Peter Pels puts it, made the creole 
‘necessary for successful communication’.12 
This article pursues the idea that creolisation is the process whereby South Sudanese 
Arabic became necessary in particular contexts. It also draws on another important insight 
from the linguistic studies: creole languages are distinguished from other ‘mixed languages’ 
by their distinctively innovative structures, revealing that their speakers were not simply 
aiming to speak a target superstrate language; instead the priority was immediate ease of 
communication. South Sudanese Arabic was a new language, distinguished by morphological 
restructuring such as the adoption of verbal prefixes to denote tense, rendering it largely 
unintelligible with Arabic dialects.
13
 The creolisation of South Sudanese Arabic did not result 
simply from a compulsion or desire to speak the language of central state power. 
Taking these linguistic lessons together, this article argues that they demonstrate why 
linguistic creolisation is such an apt metaphor – as well as medium – for wider processes. 
Much historical and political discourse within and about South Sudan has perpetuated a set of 
stark dichotomies between state and society, modernity and tradition, and between urban and 
rural societies and economies. Such binaries have been increasingly questioned in wider 
scholarship, and yet spatial metaphors of ‘spheres’ and ‘boundaries’ have remained hard to 
avoid.
14
 Studies of African chiefs, for example, analyse their role as ‘gatekeepers’, ‘brokers’, 
and cultural ‘interpreters’, mediating between state and society.15 Accounts of legal pluralism 
often employ the term ‘hybrid’, the origins of which imply ‘that original pure and 
                                                          
12
 Jourdan, ‘Pidgins’, 196; Pels, ‘Creolisation’, 8. See also Miller, ‘The relevance’; C. Githiora, ‘Sheng: peer 
language, Swahili dialect or emerging creole?’, Journal of African Cultural Studies, 15:2 (2002), 166. 
13
 J. Owens, ‘Creole Arabic: the orphan of all orphans’, Anthropological Linguistics, 43:3 (2001), 357. 
14
 Gupta, ‘Blurred’; J. Alexander, The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 
1893–2003 (Oxford, 2006), 9; Hagmann and Péclard, ‘Negotiating’, 549–51; C. Lund, ‘Twilight institutions: an 
introduction’, Development and Change, 37:4 (2006), 678–9. 
15
 D. I. Ray and E. A. B. Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, ‘The new relevance of traditional authorities to Africa’s 
future’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law (JLPUL), 37–8 (1996), 1–38; and D. G. Hatt, 
‘Establishing tradition: the development of chiefly authority in the western High Atlas mountains of Morocco, 
1890–1990’, JLPUL 37–8 (1996), 123–53. 
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homogeneous elements entered into a combination’.16 Creolisation on the other hand is not 
the straightforward amalgamation of two languages; rather, it is the emergence of something 
new that, as Justin Willis puts it, is ‘more than simply a blend of its constituent parts’.17 
Creoles emerge precisely ‘in order that people sharing no language may communicate’.18 
Similarly the history of local state formation should not be understood as a binary 
conversation between colonisers and colonised, state and non-state, nor as the hybrid 
combination of two distinct strands: one urban, cosmopolitan, and governmental; the other 
rural, mono-ethnic, and traditional. The spread of South Sudanese Arabic far beyond its 
military origins suggests that we should think instead in terms of broader ‘fields of 
interaction’, or ‘negotiation arenas’, in which the boundaries between state and non-state 
actors have been blurred.
19
 Through the interaction and negotiation among these multiple 
actors, the novel idea and institutions of the local state would emerge.  
 
<A Head>THE ORIGINS OF SOUTH SUDANESE ARABIC: NEGOTIATING THE 
VIOLENCE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY</A Head> 
 
Pidgin and creole languages are generally associated with the unequal power relations of 
colonialism and the dominance of ‘superstrate’ European languages over the ‘substrate’ 
languages of the colonised. Indeed the wider adoption by non-linguists of the term 
‘creolisation’ for imprecise or positive notions of cultural intermingling and globalisation has 
                                                          
16
 D.-C. Martin, ‘A creolising South Africa? mixing, hybridity, and creolisation: (re)imagining the South 
African experience’, International Social Science Journal, 58:187 (2006), 169. Justin Willis is similarly critical 
of the term ‘hybridity’: J. Willis, ‘Hukm: the creolization of authority in Condominium Sudan’, The Journal of 
African History, 46:1 (2005), 30. 
17
 Willis, ‘Hukm’, 31. 
18
 Swigart, ‘Cultural’, 178. 
19
 J. Fabian, Language and Colonial Power: The Appropriation of Swahili in the Former Belgian Congo, 1880–
1938 (Cambridge, 1986), 9; Hagmann and Péclard, ‘Negotiating’, 550–1 and 557. See also Alexander, The 
Unsettled, 4; C. Vaughan, ‘Negotiating the state at its margins: colonial authority in Condominium Darfur, 
1916–1956’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Durham University, 2011); Gupta, ‘Blurred’, 384. 
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been criticised for ignoring the political origins and racial connotations of the term.
20
 
Colonial domination is very much to the forefront of one historical account of an African 
creole language: Johannes Fabian’s study of Shaba Swahili in eastern Congo, where the need 
for ‘communication with the colonized’ led to colonial attempts to standardise and control 
this lingua franca.
21
 South Sudanese Arabic was never officially recognised by the colonial 
state, let alone standardised. But it originated in an earlier context of domination and 
subordination:  in the southward expansion of the ivory and slave trade and of Turco-
Egyptian imperialism in the nineteenth century, and in the military slavery on which this 
expansion relied.
22
  
From 1820, the Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan pushed the frontier of slave-
raiding further south, but vegetation blockages on the Nile prevented the extension of riverain 
trade until 1840–1, when an expedition sent by the Governor of Egypt, Mohammed ’Ali, 
reached the Gondokoro area (near modern-day Juba). Over subsequent decades, multinational 
traders, with their private armies of northern Sudanese mercenaries and southern slave-
soldiers, established fortified stations known as zara’ib across the Bahr el Ghazal and 
Equatorial regions, from which they traded and raided the surrounding populations for ivory, 
supplies, and slaves. From 1869, these territories were annexed to the government and the 
Egyptian army took over or established its own stations, from which a similar system of 
raiding largely continued.
23
 
                                                          
20
 For an early application of the term to global cultures, see U. Hannerz, ‘The world in creolisation’, Africa, 
57:4 (1987), 546–59. For critical discussion, see M. Sheller, ‘Creolization in discourses of global culture’, in S. 
Ahmed (ed.), Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and Migration (Oxford, 2003), 273–94; C. Stewart, 
‘Syncretism and its synonyms: reflections on cultural mixture’, Diacritics, 29:3 (1999), 40–62; Martin, ‘A 
creolising’. 
21
 Fabian, Language, 3. 
22
 See D. H. Johnson, ‘The structure of a legacy: military slavery in northeast Africa’, Ethnohistory, 36:1 (1989), 
72–88; D. H. Johnson, ‘Recruitment and entrapment in private slave armies: the structure of the zara’ib in the 
southern Sudan’, in Elizabeth Savage (ed.), The Human Commodity: Perspectives on the Trans-Saharan Slave 
Trade (London, 1992), 162–73. 
23
 For detailed histories of this period, see R. Gray, A History of the Southern Sudan, 1839–1889 (Oxford, 
1961); J. O. Udal, The Nile in Darkness (Norwich, 2005 [orig. pub. 1998]). 
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In the zara’ib, Sudanese or Egyptian colloquial Arabic speakers formed a small 
minority in relation to the expanding population of soldiers, slaves, and servants captured or 
recruited within the south, among whom a military pidgin Arabic would develop into early 
varieties of South Sudanese Arabic.
24
 Clearly these were contexts of inequality, in which 
Arabic and Ottoman Turkish were the superstrate languages of imperial power. Yet Jonathan 
Owens argues that the linguistic structures of South Sudanese Arabic are distinct from either 
Arabic or the vernaculars, reflecting innovative restructuring by its nineteenth-century 
speakers. It is difficult to tell from the nineteenth-century sources precisely what kind of 
Arabic was being used in and around the zara’ib, but the fragmentary references to 
‘vehicular’, ‘indigenised’, or ‘slang’ Arabic spoken by soldiers and other southerners indicate 
that it was not the Arabic of northern Sudan or Egypt. Its distinctive structures would also be 
preserved in the language of the southern soldiers who later moved into Uganda and became 
known as ‘Nubi’, and whose creole Arabic began to be recorded in the early twentieth 
century.
25
  
The commercial and imperial forces had recognised the need for negotiation from the 
outset, and used southern slave-soldiers as interpreters, known by the Turkish term 
‘dragoman’. The 1840–1 expedition brought two Dinka interpreters from Khartoum, whose 
influence was immense: ‘even the expressions of the natives cannot be depended upon, for 
our black soldiers can translate just what pleases them’.26 Local interpreters subsequently 
emerged along the Nile; by the 1860s, ‘many of the natives in the vicinity of Gondokoro 
                                                          
24
 Nakao, ‘Revising’, 128–9. 
25
 Owens, ‘Arabic-based’, 140–1 and 146; Owens, ‘Creole’, 364; C. Miller, ‘Le Juba Arabic. Une lingua franca 
du Soudan Meridional: Remarque sur le fonctionnement du verbe’, Matériaux Arabes et Sudarabiques (1983), 
105–18; Miller, ‘The relevance’, 20; U. A. Mahmud, Arabic in the Southern Sudan: history and spread of a 
pidgin-creole (Khartoum, 1983), 43–4. 
26
 F. Werne, Expedition to Discover the Sources of the White Nile, in the Years 1840, 1841 (London, 1849), II, 
133, 46, and 56. 
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[had] learnt a little Arabic from the traders’, albeit ‘with a peculiar accent’.27 In 2008, an 
elderly Bari politician located the origins of South Sudanese Arabic in the Gondokoro area: 
 
<extract>The Baris began to learn the language of the traders, Arabic. Intelligent 
Baris who learned a bit of Arabic also became translators. There was this mixing up 
of trade and soldiers coming to the village. The Arabic language in Juba has a lot of 
Bari words in it. It is more or less half Arabic and half Bari.
28
</extract> 
 
Owens acknowledges that ‘Bari substratal influence is observable’ in South Sudanese Arabic 
though the major source of its vocabulary is Arabic; recent research by Shuichiro Nakao 
suggests the substratal influence of other vernacular languages too, reflecting the extent of 
local interaction around the stations.
29
 
According to the historian Richard Gray, ‘the Turks became dependent on these 
riverain Bari to act as middlemen in the search for and purchase of further supplies’.30 The 
relatively peaceful early relations along the Nile deteriorated, however, as the traders 
established a network of zara’ib across the Bahr el Ghazal region to the west, accompanied 
by increasing raiding, enslavement, and local warfare. Yet even in this violent context, the 
need to negotiate local relations, trade, and alliances was recognised by the trading forces, 
who taught young slaves Arabic so that they might become ‘interpreters and commercial 
agents’.31 Local people also saw the value in having their own interpreters: one Zande chief 
sent a boy with a trading agent to learn Arabic ‘so that he might hereafter be useful to his 
                                                          
27
 S. W. Baker, The Albert N’yanza: Great Basin of the Nile, and Explorations of the Nile Sources (London, 
1867 [orig. pub. 1866]), 105 and 177–8; E. Pedemonte, ‘A report on the voyage of 1849–1850’, in E. Toniolo 
and R. L. Hill (eds.), The Opening of the Nile Basin: Writings by Members of the Catholic Mission to Central 
Africa on the Geography and Ethnography of the Sudan, 1842–1881 (New York, 1975), 62. 
28
 Interview with elderly male Bari retired engineer, Juba, 26 Aug. 2008. 
29
 Owens, ‘Arabic-based’, 163; Nakao, ‘Revising’. 
30
 Gray, A History, 35. 
31
 Ibid. 45. 
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tribe as interpreter’.32 The violent depredations of raiding parties were only ameliorated by 
entering into relations and alliances with the zara’ib, and a common means of communication 
was therefore vital to securing protection for local people. Oral histories often trace the 
origins of chiefship to the bravery of the interlocutors who first negotiated relations with the 
trading forces so that people settled in the vicinity of the camps.
33
  
Linguistic knowledge and skills of interlocution did not simply produce alliances 
between traders and local groups, but in the process also produced new forms of power and 
authority. In the 1870s, Zande spearmen trained in the zara’ib were reportedly becoming 
‘chiefs’, having ‘learnt to speak Arabic fluently’. 34  By this time the Turco-Egyptian 
government was establishing its own network of stations or taking over the trading zara’ib; 
the ‘Arab-speaking Baris’ retained a privileged position in the stations on the Nile as 
‘interpreters, translators and inspectors’.35 The role of interpreters was increasingly being 
formalised as a nascent government chiefship, though strikingly they retained their title of 
‘dragoman’. One or two dragomans were said to be placed in every village near the stations: 
 
<extract>These men were originally slaves of the old slave-dealers. They all speak 
Arabic and were trained first as gun-boys, and now are employed as a kind of native 
police. Each native village is required to support one or more of these men, who are 
responsible for the peace of the place, and also superintend the payment of the grain 
tax to the government. Some twenty or thirty of them live near a fort and when porters 
                                                          
32
 J. Petherick and K. H. Petherick, Travels in Central Africa, and Explorations of the Western Nile Tributaries 
(London, 1869), 141.  
33
 C. Leonardi, Dealing with Government in South Sudan: Histories of Chiefship, Community and State 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2013), 34; Johnson, ‘Recruitment’, 170. 
34
 G. A. Schweinfurth, The Heart of Africa: Three Years’ Travels and Adventures in the Unexplored Regions of 
Central Africa, from 1868 to 1871, trans. E. E. Frewer (New York, 1874), I, 226, 465, and 473. 
35
 W. Junker, Travels in Africa, During the Years 1875–1878, trans. A. H. Keane (London, 1890), 236; C. T. 
Wilson and R. W. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan (London, 1882), II and 99. 
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are wanted, or natives required for work at the station, they are commissioned to 
collect the requisite number.
36
</extract> 
 
According to Robert Felkin, writing in the 1880s, the dragomans were ‘freed slaves, who are 
employed as police-soldiers, and negotiate with the natives’.37  
 From the outset then, knowledge and use of the emerging South Sudanese Arabic was 
associated with military force; the local ‘negotiations’ by interpreters were obviously skewed 
by the threat of violence to which their privileged linguistic knowledge gave them access. But 
if anything, this gave people the incentive to acquire some of this linguistic knowledge for 
themselves, and hence South Sudanese Arabic spread beyond the station inhabitants and 
individual interpreters. General Gordon witnessed a whole village, many of whose 
inhabitants were Arabic-speaking, moving into the vicinity of a station, and predicted that 
‘Arabic must be the language of these countries’.38  Concentric circles of settlement and 
interaction developed around the zara’ib and government stations, creating arenas in which 
both language and negotiation were shaped by localised needs and tensions.
39
 Relatively 
peaceful relations might be achieved around some stations, but these could also break down 
when communication failed. 
 In the Rumbek area of Bahr el Ghazal, for example, some of the earliest zara’ib had 
been established from the 1850s with the aid of Dinka interpreters and allies; in 1860, ‘chiefs’ 
from the Cic and Agar Dinka came to greet the new European owner of the Ronga zariba, 
and to invoke ‘the trader’s alliance’ to fight their enemies, as Gray puts it.40 Rumbek later 
                                                          
36
 Wilson and Felkin, Uganda, II, 104, and 107–9; S. W. Baker, Ismailia: A Narrative of the Expedition to 
Central Africa for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, Organized by Ismail, Khedive of Egypt (London, 1874), 
II, 48. 
37
 Mrs. R. W. Felkin, translator’s note, in E. Pasha, Emin Pasha in Central Africa, Being a Collection of His 
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became the province headquarters for the Egyptian government; Gaetano Casati described the 
‘friendly relations’ and ‘truce’ that developed here between the Agar Dinka and a particular 
governor, whom they called ‘our man’.41 After this governor left, however, relations around 
the station deteriorated. In 1881, a ‘deputation of Agar chiefs’ trekked all the way to the 
government headquarters at Lado on the Nile, to complain to Emin Pasha about the abduction 
of their children by the station forces, prompting Emin’s visit to Rumbek.42 In 1883, an Agar 
war leader, Wol Athiang, led a successful attack on the station and the garrison was 
subsequently withdrawn.
43
 Yet even Wol Athiang had previously engaged in closer relations 
with the Rumbek station; his sister was married to or owned by an Egyptian officer.
44
 This 
example demonstrates the importance of local alliances and negotiation to the operation of 
the trading zara’ib and government garrisons; and it reveals how local interlocutors were 
prepared to approach the state forces directly to negotiate alliances and to ameliorate the 
depredations of raiding parties.  
Egyptian government rule collapsed in the 1880s in the face of the Mahdist uprising 
in Sudan, and the last governor of Equatoria, Emin Pasha, was famously forced to withdraw 
southwards and eventually be ‘rescued’ by Henry Stanley. But the southern Sudanese soldiers 
remained in Equatoria or what would become northern Uganda; some joined the Mahdist 
forces in Equatoria, while others were recruited into Frederick Lugard’s forces in Uganda in 
the 1890s.
45
 The latter settled in Uganda or Kenya and became known as Nubi or Nubian, 
retaining their creole Arabic language, Kinubi. The early origins of this creolisation are 
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evident in the structural and lexical similarity of South Sudanese Arabic and Kinubi, despite 
their limited contact after the 1880s.
46
 
In the wake of the subsequent Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of Sudan in 1898, many of 
the old Egyptian stations were taken over by the British officers of the new Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium of the Sudan, or by their compatriots in the colonial government of Uganda, 
which administered part of eastern Equatoria from Gondokoro until 1914. Some of the 
southern soldiers from the old Egyptian garrisons returned to the stations along the Nile; 
Kinubi was the principal language used in the Ugandan headquarters at Gondokoro, and it 
was also widely spoken on the west bank in the Belgian Lado Enclave.
47
 The Sudan 
government relied on southern soldiers and interpreters from the Egyptian or Mahdist armies, 
such as Rihan Effendi Abdulla ‘ex-slave native of Gogrial’ who accompanied the Bahr el 
Ghazal ‘reoccupation’ force in 1901, or the interpreter at Mongalla, El Amin Rabeh, a Bari 
soldier who had fought in the Mahdist army.
48
 When the Sudan government took over the 
Lado Enclave in 1910, they again turned to soldiers who were originally from the Enclave to 
be the most ‘useful and reliable’ interpreters and guides.49 Communities of retired soldiers 
and their descendants formed the nuclei of the small urban administrative centres, particularly 
along the Nile, living in the malakiya (‘civilian’) ‘native’ quarters and speaking South 
Sudanese Arabic as their first language.
50
 Other people would be drawn into these Malakiyan 
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communities through military or police service, or marriage, adopting Islam and South 
Sudanese Arabic.
51
 
Though never explicitly sanctioned or acknowledged by the colonial government, 
South Sudanese Arabic was thus given a privileged place in local administration from the 
outset, as well as retaining its association with the coercive forces of the state. As in the 
nineteenth century, language and interpreting were often central to the selection of local 
chiefs; some of those recognised as chief had been soldiers or employees of previous 
governments, and many spoke at least some Arabic.
52
 The Uganda government recognised as 
Bari chiefs men who had been interpreters and allies of the Mahdist forces.
53
 Even in the 
predominantly Dinka-speaking districts like Rumbek, some early chiefs were Arabic-
speaking former police or army conscripts; a later British official in northern Bahr el Ghazal 
admitted that many chiefs ‘had a knowledge of Arabic as their only qualification’.54 The early 
reports did not specify what kind of Arabic this was, but later reports referred to the early 
chiefs having gained their positions through their knowledge of ‘bastard Arabic’, as the 
British termed it.
55
 By the 1920s, British officers would acknowledge the prevalence of a 
distinctive South Sudanese Arabic in the government stations. Multiethnic settlements were 
forming around the recognised chiefs and around the government posts, contributing to the 
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need for a lingua franca among these people seeking protection and opportunity in the 
emerging local state.
56
 
The first two decades of colonial rule thus consolidated rather than disrupted the 
patterns that had developed over the nineteenth century, in which knowledge of Arabic was 
converted into new positions of power and intermediation. But these intermediaries had not 
simply sought to acquire the Arabic or English of imperial rulers; nor was there an existing 
lingua franca like Swahili in eastern Africa for them to adopt. Instead varieties of a new 
language had emerged out of the particular circumstances of the military stations and their 
local relations, produced by the need for communication on the ground more than by the 
imposition of a superstrate colonial language. This would become even more evident in the 
mid-colonial period, when the government did seek to replace this creole language with 
English.  
 
<A Head>‘BAD ARABIC’? EXPRESSING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF 
COLONIALISM, c. 1920–50</A Head> 
 
In the 1920s, British colonial administrators in southern Sudan increasingly reported the 
ubiquity of what they described as a ‘pidgin’ Arabic in the government stations, army, and 
police, and noted its wider spread with some alarm. The local state had retained its coercive 
character as the colonial government sought to enforce taxation and labour demands through 
an increasingly formalised system of chiefs with their own police and courts. Yet the effects 
of this state coercion were complex, opening up related arenas of economic activity and 
social and political interaction, which were never entirely controlled by the state. To the 
dislike of colonial officials, the district headquarters were gradually turning into small towns, 
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as some people discerned opportunity as well as threat in the new arenas of offices, markets, 
and courts.
57
 The need for communication in these arenas would consolidate South Sudanese 
Arabic as a lingua franca, so that even British officials were drawn into using it as a language 
of local government and commerce. 
This pragmatic government use of South Sudanese Arabic was increasingly at odds 
with official policy, however. Unlike the deliberate cultivation or tolerance of Swahili and its 
standardisation as an intermediary lingua franca by colonial governments in the Congo, 
Tanganyika or Kenya, the Sudan government sought to suppress South Sudanese Arabic 
altogether.
58
 The Condominium government feared the spread of subversive, nationalist 
activity into Sudan after the instability and eventual independence of Egypt in 1922, a fear 
exacerbated by urban and military unrest in northern Sudan in 1924. Rural Sudanese were 
therefore to be governed by traditional authorities and insulated from the ‘septic germs’ of 
such unrest.
59
 The ‘Southern Policy’, articulated in 1930 as the desired creation of ‘self-
contained racial or tribal units’, has been seen as a deliberate attempt to separate northern and 
southern Sudan.
60
 But it was also part of this broader colonial campaign against the perceived 
effects of education, religious fervour, urbanisation, and migration: effects which were 
assumed to have the most disruptive potential among hitherto illiterate, non-Muslim 
southerners.
61
 Northern Sudanese traders still operated under license in the southern 
provinces, but the administration sought to separate such townspeople from the rural ‘tribes’. 
Yet the colonial government also required literate junior employees: in turning to the 
Christian mission societies to produce these, it entered into a long-term struggle over the 
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nature and purpose of schooling; a Christian education was also seen by many administrators 
as dangerous, if it detached pupils from the supposedly restraining ties of family and 
traditional community.
62
 Meanwhile, however, colonial labour, taxation, and agricultural 
policies were having even greater transformative effect on local economy and society, by 
generating labour migration, market production, and monetisation.
63
 
These contradictions and tensions between the conservative visions of traditional rural 
society and the far-reaching effects of colonial economic and administrative policies were 
epitomised by discussion of language policy in the southern provinces from the 1920s.
64
 In 
attempting to insulate southerners from subversive influences, the government sought to 
exclude Arabic of any kind, and instead to make English and the vernaculars the languages of 
administration and education in the south.
65
 But there were already warnings of the ubiquity 
of ‘a debased form of Arabic’.66 In 1927, even Governor-General John Maffey, the leading 
proponent of the conservative ‘Native Administration’ policies, encountered this reality while 
on a tour of the south: 
 
<extract>I have now fully appreciated the difficulties of ever making English the 
lingua franca of the south. Things have gone much further than I had expected. 
Wherever I penetrated, whether to the top of the Imatong [mountains] or to the 
Belgian Congo border, I found Arabic in ready use by the local spokesman of the 
people … Indeed we shall have to consider whether Arabic, after all, in spite of its 
risks, must not be our instrument.
67
</extract> 
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A few months later, the education secretary, Matthew, issued a memorandum explicitly 
identifying a ‘language problem’ in southern Sudan. He argued that ‘Southern Arabic’ was 
‘totally unfit to be used for educational purposes’, since it was ‘only a clumsy instrument’. 
He went on to raise a central concern of the government: that this ‘pidgin’ might start to be 
written in Arabic script, which risked encouraging Islamicisation and Arabicisation. One 
solution would be to write it in Roman script, but other British officials argued that teaching 
‘bastard Arabic’ using English characters was not ‘education in the true meaning of the 
term’.68 
 Such debates rumbled on through the 1930s among British officials across all three 
southern provinces. In 1936, the Resident Inspector of Southern Education declared that the 
attempt to introduce English ‘as the language of communication’ had been largely a ‘failure’: 
 
<extract>Arabic is in fact the lingua franca. It is regarded not so much as the language 
of Islam but as the language of Government … It is bad Arabic ungrammatical [sic], 
incapable of exact statement, but it serves the purpose of the natives in their dealings 
with each other, has a certain prestige and will suffice to get him in touch with 
Government officials. He learns sufficient for his needs and no more, but there are 
very few places in which no one knows any Arabic … The market place is a greater 
factor in the spreading of Arabic than the Government Official and these two are the 
main factors; but a third is the increasing necessity of some lingua franca between 
tribes …69</extract> 
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This latter point was reiterated by the district commissioner (DC) of Yei, who declared 
bluntly that the question of a lingua franca had already been solved: ‘Arabic is the language 
of intercommunication and commerce in the Southern Sudan.’70 A number of other officials 
expressed a similar recognition or resignation at the limited capacity of government to control 
the use of ‘bastard Arabic’: ‘One cannot dictate to the native what shall become his lingua 
franca, he will choose what is most useful to him.’ Even in a district like Zeraf, where the 
entire population spoke Nuer, the DC reported that Arabic was spreading as ‘the language of 
both trade and wage-earning’. The Upper Nile Province governor added that an ‘almost 
unrecognisable’ Arabic had ‘already got a strong hold, especially among the Dinka in this 
province’, and that efforts might better be concentrated on ‘teaching the police to talk 
understandable Arabic’.71 
Many officials remained opposed to the teaching or writing of this ‘Southern Arabic’ 
or ‘Mongalese’, however.72 In 1942, one British officer (and later DC), Captain Lyth of the 
Equatorial Corps, announced that he was translating certain Christian texts into ‘Mongallese 
pidgin Arabic’, to be printed for use in military services, and for sale in Juba. Lyth had the 
temerity, and prescience, to question the government’s language policy: 
 
<extract>Mongallese is the only language – if it may be dignified by such a name – 
universally known and used throughout the Equatorial Corps, by both black and white 
alike (as well as in all the market-places in your Province.) Because of this, its users 
have had to find means to express every shade of meaning which they require in 
conversation, and this they succeed in doing, if sometimes in a somewhat roundabout 
way, very satisfactorily … It is interesting in passing, is it not, to notice in books 
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dealing with the period of Emin Pasha’s governorship, that an almost identical form 
of pidgin Arabic was then in use in the Equatorial Province … The policy of the 
Sudan Government would therefore appear to be almost as optimistic – though no 
doubt as wholly commendable – as that of the Uganda Government in attempting to 
eradicate the pidgin form of Swahili in favour of English.
73
 </extract> 
 
Lyth was forbidden to use or sell the booklet. But even while expressing his disapproval of 
any written form of Southern Arabic, the education inspector, Hickson, did admit that ‘in fact 
people do write Mongallese (the local tailor does so when sending me my bill)’.74 Some of 
the early chiefs’ court records in Mongalla Province were also being kept in ‘Arabic in 
English characters’, though increasingly the government would insist on English or 
vernacular record-keeping.
75
 
British administrators thus remained well aware of the widespread use of South 
Sudanese Arabic, including in their own communication with traders, chiefs, soldiers, and 
servants, unless they had learned the vernacular – which was more difficult in linguistically 
plural districts, and became less common as officials served shorter periods in one district.
76
 
Most colonial officers in the Sudan Political Service had studied Arabic. But they too were 
contributing to the distinctive South Sudanese Arabic by employing their own simplified 
version, sometimes known as ‘Bimbashi’ Arabic (the lowest rank held by British military 
officers was that of Bimbashi, or major). As the British linguist Tucker put it:  
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<extract>Any remnant of grammar left is more English than Semitic, the British 
official finding it much easier to string Arabic words together in an English sentence-
order than to attempt a Northern construction which would quite probably be 
unfamiliar to his hearers.
77
</extract> 
 
Unlike the attempts to master and control Swahili in Belgian Congo, the official disapproval of 
Arabic meant that the creole language was developing without any formal government rules or 
grammars.
78
 
In the courts, South Sudanese Arabic often functioned as an intermediary language, which 
was (just about) comprehensible to British DCs, and into which the vernaculars were translated by 
police officers or court interpreters.
79
 As in other colonial contexts, this clearly gave interpreters 
and chiefs considerable power to control interactions with colonial officials.
80
 As one DC revealed 
in 1948: in rural areas, ‘chiefs are apt to take advantage of their unsophisticated subjects who speak 
no Arabic and are all too rarely in contact with a district commissioner’.81 It might be assumed then 
that South Sudanese Arabic acted as a ‘boundary marker’ to elite status, enabling chiefs, police and 
interpreters to act as powerful gatekeepers to the colonial state.
82
  
But as we have seen, languages tend to defy rather than to demarcate boundaries.
83
 While 
South Sudanese Arabic retained its association with state coercion, this only encouraged its wider 
spread, as Tucker acknowledged: 
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<extract>With the opening of roads and the protection given to travellers, it has 
spread throughout the Southern Sudan, its pronunciation varying from tribe to tribe. It 
also had – and still has in some areas – a great prestige as being the language best 
calculated to win favour with the police … Ultimately, of course, it was a useful 
language to know, should one’s case come before the District Commissioner, since it 
enabled the plaintiff to evade the court interpreter, who was not always to be trusted 
to translate fairly unless well bribed.
84
</extract> 
 
While literacy in English did remain restricted, spoken South Sudanese Arabic could be more 
easily acquired, especially through interaction in the small towns and markets. Again this 
demonstrates the blurring of boundaries, as the colonial government sought – but largely 
failed – to prevent such interaction or to keep people out of the towns. Even in the 
predominantly Dinka-speaking districts of Rumbek and Yirrol, administrators reported 
recurring struggles to evict ‘rural’ people from the town and to combat the influence of 
‘detribalised’ and ‘Arabic speaking’ townspeople, including women beer sellers, schoolboys 
and young men, chiefs, and the families of government employees.
85
 Officials reiterated that 
South Sudanese Arabic had taken hold as a result of the necessity of and demand for ‘a 
common means of communication’, not just between government and people, but to enable 
‘intercourse at Government centres between people speaking different languages’.86 As we 
have seen, linguists increasingly define creolisation as the development of a main and 
necessary language in just such contexts. 
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Even though urbanisation and the spread of South Sudanese Arabic were actively 
discouraged by the government, these processes – and the wider process of commoditisation 
that the government did encourage – were contributing to state formation by producing new 
kinds of local political competition and new disputes, which people turned to institutions 
associated with the state to resolve. The earliest formal chiefs’ courts established in the 1920s 
and 1930s were reported to be copying all the militaristic and authoritarian styles of state 
policing and government offices. But over time they became key arenas in which to negotiate 
rights and relations, leading colonial officials to comment on the litigious nature of southern 
Sudanese societies. By 1947, officials in Rumbek were concerned that the appeal court 
sessions held in the town were attracting two to three thousand people a day, and encouraging 
‘all and sundry’ to come to town.87  
As the courts became ever more crowded arenas, so their use of South Sudanese 
Arabic expanded beyond any original use merely as an intermediary language. By the 1940s, 
one DC described ‘Mongallese Arabic’ as the nearest thing to a lingua franca in the courts.88 
Its use produced an enduring vocabulary that spread beyond the courts and into the 
vernaculars: Arabic words like ‘garama’ (court fine) and ‘sijin’ (prison) were reportedly 
replacing vernacular terms in the Bari language by the early 1930s.
89
 The process of 
linguistic creolisation was ongoing as South Sudanese Arabic became ever more necessary. 
At the same time a kind of legal and judicial creolisation was occurring in the chiefs’ courts, 
as they became the site for the negotiation of new rights and regulations. The laws and 
procedures of these local courts were a product not simply of the hybridisation of colonial 
with indigenous justice, but of the ongoing, local negotiation and contestation of legal rights 
and duties among multiple actors with varying degrees of incorporation or relationship to the 
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state. Like the creole language in which some of this negotiation took place, this local justice 
was thus not a combination of two distinct strands, but a novel, creative production emerging 
from debates over individual and collective rights in the context of the new colonial 
economy.
90
 
South Sudanese Arabic embodied the contradictions of colonialism: neither the 
idealised rural vernacular, nor the formal grammar and script of colonial government. Yet it 
did not simply hang ‘uncertainly between languages and worlds’ like the Arabic words 
adopted into government discourse in northern Sudan; rather, it took on a life of its own.
91
  
South Sudanese Arabic was expanding and undergoing a genuine linguistic creolisation – 
becoming a main and necessary language in particular contexts – which was beyond the 
power of the colonial state to prevent or control, even though those very contexts were the 
product and site of state formation. Revealingly, when the first province councils were 
established in the late 1940s, ‘Mongallese Arabic’ was the main language used among the 
chiefs and other members of the Equatoria Province Council.
92
 But from the 1950s, the 
sudden attempt to integrate north and south through the medium of Arabic would generate 
new political tensions around the meaning and use of language in southern Sudan. 
 
<Article Head>THE LANGUAGE OF THE SOUTH? DISPARITIES IN THE 
MEANING AND USE OF SOUTH SUDANESE ARABIC AFTER 1956</Article Head> 
 
Catherine Miller emphasises the frequent disparity between the ‘symbolic importance’ of a 
language and its actual role in socioeconomic – and, I would add, political – life, a disparity 
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which is often particularly acute in the case of creole languages.
93
 The disparity between the 
meaning and use of South Sudanese Arabic is paralleled by a set of discursive dichotomies 
that have been constructed in southern (now South) Sudan since Sudan’s independence in 
1956 – between state and society, town and countryside, money and non-money economies – 
which belie long-term processes of local state-making, urbanisation, and commoditisation. 
Southern political leaders have promoted English as a government language in opposition to 
the Sudanese Arabic of Khartoum, reflecting both a heritage of Christian missionary 
education and the increasing links of southern Sudan to neighbouring Anglophone countries. 
Meanwhile, the vernacular languages have remained associated with rurally rooted, ethnic 
cultures and traditions and seen as the authentic vehicles of southern identities. South 
Sudanese Arabic has had an uneasy or unacknowledged position in such political discourse, 
associated variously with state coercion and the military, with northern Sudanese Arabic, or 
with urbanisation and the erosion of ethnic culture. Processes of urbanisation, militarisation, 
and local state formation since the 1950s have continued to generate moral concern and 
debate among southerners. But the numbers of people participating in these processes have 
only multiplied, ensuring the increasing necessity of an alternative to either the vernaculars or 
the oscillating government languages of English and Sudanese Arabic, by which southerners 
might communicate among themselves in local arenas of the state. Such everyday 
communication has been more important for negotiating state and nation than the politicised 
discourses about language reveal. 
From the later 1950s, the newly-independent Sudan government promoted Arabic 
language and Islamic education in the south with increasing forcefulness, a campaign which 
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was revived again from the 1980s, and particularly under the National Islamic Front 
government in the 1990s.
94
 The southern political opposition therefore associated Sudanese 
Arabic with northern domination, and instead promoted English; while they could speak 
South Sudanese Arabic, they did not endorse it as a vehicle of southern identity.
95
 During the 
peace of 1972–83 and again since 2005, English was recognised as the official language of 
Southern Sudan and, since 2011, as the national language of the new South Sudanese state.
96
  
Unlike Swahili in East Africa, South Sudanese Arabic has not been formally recognised as an 
official political language of national integration.
97
 But while the political leaders might 
prefer to promote English for ideological reasons, during both periods of civil war they were 
forced – like the colonial government had been – to accept South Sudanese Arabic as a 
military lingua franca for pragmatic reasons, as ‘the only common language which could be 
relatively easily acquired’ by the ordinary southerners recruited into the rebel forces.98 
This recent history has generated continuing ambiguity towards South Sudanese 
Arabic: its military and coercive associations have been retained, and some southerners also 
associate it with Sudanese Arabic and hence with government policies of Arabicisation and 
Islamicisation. For those who took refuge in Uganda or Kenya during the civil wars and 
studied in English, Arabic of any form has carried ‘a stigma’ of northern Sudanese 
oppression, whereas English became seen as ‘a medium of communication with other 
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Africans’ as well as among southern Sudanese.99  When such refugees returned to South 
Sudan from 2005 onwards, however, they found themselves criticised for not knowing any 
South Sudanese Arabic, and referred to as ‘uncivilised’ or baladi (rural/provincial).100 The 
association of South Sudanese Arabic – here subsumed in the category of ‘Simple Arabic’ – 
with the towns was noted by a newspaper contributor from Juba in 2007: 
 
<extract>When I was growing up in this town in the mid 1960s and 1970s I thought 
Simple Arabic was the language of the people of Southern Sudan. But before long, I 
discovered it was not. Some of my relatives who visited our family from countryside 
or village could not speak or understand the simplest version of Simple Arabic. We 
use to call those relatives Ahaale, meaning villagers or uncivilised.
101
</extract> 
 
According to an early 1970s study by Abdon Agaw, a Bor Dinka linguist, ‘[t]he 
continuous intermingling of people in different towns in the southern region’ had encouraged 
the spread of South Sudanese Arabic.
102
 He also recognised that it was becoming a first 
language among children in the bigger towns.
103
 By the early twenty-first century, many 
urban families – even mono-ethnic ones – were speaking South Sudanese Arabic in the home, 
and their children were learning it as a first language. This has raised considerable concern 
about the threat to the vernacular languages. Even – or perhaps especially – in Juba, the town 
most associated historically with South Sudanese Arabic, many political leaders and other 
commentators have been bemoaning its spread in recent years: ‘[t]he problem is the 
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encroachment of Arabic deep into the [rural] areas, and people forgetting the Bari 
language’.104 Just as Governor Owen had asserted in 1950, the vernacular languages have 
continued to be seen by many South Sudanese as vital cultural repositories and mediums of 
expression.
105
 In contrast, South Sudanese Arabic has retained associations with the moral ills 
of town life; much scholarship on Sudan also emphasises the moral dichotomies between 
urban government and the vernacular cultures of the rural areas.
106
 
But the debates and uncertainties over the moral and political meaning of South 
Sudanese Arabic belie the reality of its spreading use and the porosity of ‘the rural-urban 
imaginary dividing line’.107 Studies in the 1970s and 1980s revealed extensive urban-rural 
linkages, and social and economic interaction, which transcended and incorporated the town 
boundaries.
108
 Women played an important role in this interaction, being responsible for 
carrying produce to markets and for alcohol production and sale in towns and marketplaces; 
interethnic marriages also encouraged the use of South Sudanese Arabic within households. 
Even in predominantly Dinka-speaking areas of Bahr el Ghazal, this language was becoming 
a valuable – indeed necessary – investment among local entrepreneurs like cattle traders.109 
South Sudanese Arabic has therefore also become ever more necessary for negotiating 
the local state. The Dinka cattle traders’ knowledge of Arabic, for example, enabled them to 
facilitate communication among local officials, townspeople, and villagers, and often to go 
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on to hold positions as chiefs or court members.
110
 Such individuals have transcended any 
clear dichotomy between state and non-state actors. Successful traders and businesspeople, 
teachers, church leaders, chiefs, elders, government employees, and other members of local 
elites have moved in and out of formal state institutions and appropriated state practices and 
regulatory orders – such as the formation of ‘committees’ with ‘chairmen’ – into local and 
familial settings like marriage negotiations or funeral gatherings. The creation of local 
government councils and committees from the 1970s opened further opportunities for 
government employment and political participation, even if their autonomy and effectiveness 
remained limited.
111
 
Alongside these councils and committees, chiefs’ courts have remained vital sites for 
the local negotiation of rights and laws, through which the idea of the state has been produced 
and reproduced. These courts represent a creolised judicial order, drawing on formal state 
laws and procedures but producing distinct judicial practices that do not correspond to 
official state regulations or to customary practices – particularly in their simultaneous awards 
of compensation and punitive fines or imprisonment.
112
 
South Sudanese Arabic was the most common language spoken in the chiefs’ courts 
in Juba in the early 1980s, as it still is nowadays. Even in Bari chiefs’ courts, litigants and 
chiefs have come to speak more in South Sudanese Arabic than in Bari. Miller recorded a 
distinctively ‘formal’ type of South Sudanese Arabic employed by litigants and chiefs in 
1980s Juba, including some old Ottoman Turkish terms as part of an established ‘court 
vocabulary’. Even a Malakiyan court judge who could speak Sudanese Arabic adapted his 
speech to that of the local litigants and ‘never tried to assert his Authority through the 
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exclusive use of a high linguistic norm’.113 These town court chiefs were not demonstrating 
their status through knowledge of the Sudanese Arabic of high office; rather they were using 
and recognising the distinctive linguistic medium of South Sudanese Arabic, which facilitated 
the most effective communication among litigants and court members. More recently, the 
chiefs’ courts have increasingly been located in the towns and heard cases from multiple 
language groups. As one MP asserted in 2008, it was vital for chiefs to know South Sudanese 
Arabic ‘because they hear cases from all the people and simple Arabic is spoken’.114 As in 
the colonial period, the use of South Sudanese Arabic in such courts privileges those with 
linguistic knowledge and experience of town and government ways. But this category has 
continued to expand and includes squatters, hawkers, brewers, and prostitutes, as well as 
government officers, chiefs, and police. By the 2000s, young townswomen in Juba and Yei 
were using South Sudanese Arabic to argue their cases vociferously in the chiefs’ courts, 
along with a wide range of other litigants. Whether or not this was a conscious decision, it 
was guaranteed to ensure the widest possible comprehension of their narratives by the chiefs, 
court officials, police, and (often vocal) multiethnic audiences. 
As South Sudanese Arabic has become ever more widely spoken, government 
officials and political actors have also found it necessary to use this language in local state 
arenas, as recognised in the 1970s: 
 
<extract>Now in Juba … politicians and leaders of popular organizations find it more 
expedient to speak Juba Arabic than to speak fluent English in addressing a public 
rally. By so doing, they stand better chances of putting their message across and of 
winning response from the audience.
115
</extract> 
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Despite the promotion of English as the official government language over the next decade, 
such use of South Sudanese Arabic had only increased by 1983: ‘As well as being used 
informally for the normal purposes of social interaction it is now also used over the radio, in 
big gatherings such as political meetings, and by public officials who wish to communicate 
with the population.’116 
Through such interaction, ideas of state and nation were also being produced: in the 
1980s, one Bari chief explicitly promoted the use of ‘our Southern Arabic’ in his court and 
criticised a young man for talking like a northerner.
117
 From this time, some scholars 
predicted that South Sudanese Arabic would be absorbed as merely a dialect of the dominant 
Sudanese Arabic, but Miller argues that such a process has been hindered by ‘a tendency to 
condemn speakers whose speech goes too much in the direction of the Arabic of the north’.118  
Indeed she argues for the increasing ‘legitimization’ of South Sudanese Arabic as ‘the 
language of the South’. Both among the displaced around Khartoum and in the South itself, 
South Sudanese Arabic came to be widely used in cultural and artistic productions. It has also 
long been used in Christian services, broadcasts, and publications by the churches, thus 
further eroding any lingering associations with Islam. It was prominent on Radio SPLA, and 
used for speeches by SPLA leader John Garang.
119
 The idea of South Sudanese Arabic as a 
unifying lingua franca for the emerging new state of South Sudan was epitomised in its use 
for the South Sudan Theatre Company’s production of Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, which was 
performed in London in 2012. Its translator, Joseph Abuk, located the creole language in the 
contradictions of colonialism and ironies of Southern Policy: ‘Juba Arabic grew up because 
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the African people in the south were not allowed by the British to speak Arabic.’120 Out of the 
exclusionary practices of the colonial and postcolonial Sudanese state, a creole language thus 
emerged to negotiate the tensions, threats, and opportunities represented by the state, 
contributing in the end to the idea of a distinctively South Sudanese state. 
 
 
<A Head>CONCLUSION</A Head> 
 
<extract>[In 2013] Juba Arabic is on the radio and in the government ministries. It is 
the language of the market place and the church hall. Most of all it’s the language of 
the youth, full of humour and ‘street cred’ … In the Konyokonyo marketplace, traders 
and hawkers from a vast range of linguistic backgrounds use Juba Arabic to do their 
business. Women from the villages bring their own words and experiment with 
language to sell their wares and cement crucial relationships. All are using Juba 
Arabic to varying degrees … It is essential to survival. A whole range of people in the 
city who barely glimpse English in the distance, need to learn Juba Arabic to make a 
living here. All the civil servants use Juba Arabic. Enter any government department 
and the language you hear is Juba Arabic. English hovers around officially and you 
may well conduct your meetings in it, but when you emerge from the minister’s office 
the staff are speaking Juba Arabic.
121
</extract> 
 
The varied uses of South Sudanese Arabic identified in this report are indicative of the 
multiple actors and arenas that have played a part in constituting the local state and in 
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blurring its boundaries over the past century or more. Some scholars have focused on 
linguistic knowledge as a means of monopolising and restricting communication with the 
colonial state, producing powerful intermediary gatekeepers.
122
 But the history of South 
Sudanese Arabic demonstrates instead that linguistic creolisation opened up, rather than 
closed down, the opportunities to negotiate the state at the local level, and that language use 
has defied and blurred any state-society boundary.  
 
The speakers of this language, from government ministers to urban youth or rural 
women traders, have not been speaking a poor imitation of an elite language; they have been 
speaking a distinct creole language which emerged out of the imperative to communicate 
within the new arenas opened up by the establishment of the state. Linguistic studies have 
defined creolisation as the process by which a pidgin language becomes necessary – 
‘essential for survival’, as this report puts it – in particular contexts. This article has argued 
that the contexts in which South Sudanese Arabic became necessary have also been the 
principal arenas of local state formation: arenas in which a wide range of individuals pursued 
rights and resources, and in the process turned to state institutions and regulatory orders like 
courts, markets, and local government councils. Attempts to inhibit the use of South 
Sudanese Arabic or to impose other official languages have failed to prevent its spread: a 
stubborn sign that a great deal of power and agency in everyday life has come to be located 
neither in the elite languages of high office nor in the idealised cultural and moral values of 
the vernaculars, but in the quotidian struggles, disputes and discussions that take place just 
outside the minister’s office – and in the markets, streets, bars, tea-places, courts, police 
stations, army barracks, and local government offices, in which this lingua franca is so often 
spoken. 
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Linguistic studies of South Sudanese Arabic have also emphasised its original 
innovative structures; creolisation is not simply a mixture of two distinct languages, but the 
creation of a new language. Again this article has suggested that this is useful device for 
thinking about local state formation, not as the hybridisation of two kinds of political culture 
(state and non-state, or modern and traditional) but as the product of multiple negotiations 
and innovations, and of the need to find a common language of governance. What is perhaps 
most striking is how both the state and the creole language emerged out of multiple local 
negotiations to exhibit broadly common features. This no doubt reflects the unbounded nature 
of local arenas and fields of interaction, and the travel of ideas, discourses, and languages. 
But some linguists have also speculated that the common features among creole languages 
more widely suggest universal ‘parallel tendencies of linguistic development in parallel social 
situations’.123 Strikingly of course, these have invariably been situations that arose in ‘the 
context of the state’.124 Studying the history of creolisation perhaps then also offers a way to 
address the central problematic raised by Gupta: ‘the relationship between the translocality of 
“the state” and the necessarily localized offices, institutions and practices in which it is 
instantiated’.125 The history of South Sudanese Arabic reveals the processes through which 
multiple versions of the local state emerged out of the imperative to communicate and 
negotiate, even in highly militarised and unequal contexts. These processes of local state 
formation produced locally distinctive articulations of governance. Yet each of these contexts 
was structured by similar tensions and needs, generating broadly common strategies and 
institutions – and a developing common language – for dealing with the threats, constraints 
and opportunities presented by the state.  
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